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Biodiesel: a new challenge 
GUILHERME LEITE DA SILVA DIAS
Whenever a new liquid fuel is introduced within the energy matrix it encounters a distribution network that is already in place, and with logistical costs that are considerably lower than they would 
be for any new alternative purpose-built network.  The entry price to be 
paid is reduced if there is an agreement to stick to the pre-existing system. 
This, effectively, means that the ﬁnancial return always stays subordinate to 
established hegemonic interests.
The introduction of alcohol fuel went through this same process, 
reinforced at the time by the fact that Petrobras had a legal monopoly.  There 
was negative reaction to the spread of the mini-distilleries and an eventual 
consolidation around a greater proportion of anhydrous alcohol being mixed 
in gasoline and the compulsory marketing of the hydrated alcohol inside a 
single logistical system for fuel distribution.  It is only now, thirty years later, 
with the technological innovation of the Otto ﬂexible engine, that there is a 
possibility for the price of alcohol to be freed from monopoly and set outside a 
sales system with coupled prices, and for each producer to be free to choose a 
distributor of his choice.
Effectively, however, there is still a monopoly because the economies of 
scale made possible by the logistical network and the existing pipes and port 
terminals, which are exclusive to Petrobras, sustain its competitive advantage. 
(Figueiredo, 2005).  The regulating agency – Agência Nacional do Petróleo 
(ANP - National Petroleum Agency) – also recognizes the strategic advantage 
of a monopoly that, until now, has maintained a heavy volume of investment in 
oil exploration; developed sophisticated technological expertise in deep water 
exploration; and, bearing in mind the limitations of Brazil’s infrastructure, 
developed a logistical network that guarantees the distribution of fuel to all 
the national territory.
The question that now arises is whether biodiesel, as another alternative 
to fossil fuels, should be introduced inside the monopoly system or outside 
of it, as a truly competitive product.  The present system of auctions, in large 
volumes, as a way of paying the subsidies needed by the producers of vegetable 
oils, makes the product a prisoner of the de-facto monopoly held by Petrobras.  
The technological alternative, the H1, consolidates the total dependence of 
the fuel’s distribution because of its obligatory passage through Petrobras 
reﬁneries, thus putting an end to the autonomy of the esteriﬁcation plants and, 
consequently, with marketing alternatives such as B100, analogous to what 
happens today with alcohol fuel for ﬂexible engine vehicles.
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We shall see later that there are technical restrictions that prevent 
current diesel engines from functioning well using pure biodiesel, but they are 
not absolute and, most importantly, can be overcome by means of a directed 
program of technological innovation.  So, within the existing regulatory 
framework, biodiesel is a mere additive to conventional diesel limited to a 5% 
mix and its price dependant on an intricate set of interests within the existing 
de-facto monopoly.
Prices, taxes and state regulation of fossil fuels
The presence of a state monopoly in the oil industry was very important 
in the history of Brazilian industrialization, as much because of the economic 
foundation of economies outside of this strategic sector as because of its role 
as a tool for concentration of state funds.  From the ﬁrst, the price of gasoline 
relative to diesel was ﬁxed so as to generate a large proﬁt to pay for a cross 
subsidy sufﬁcient to allow for a low price in the other.  The price of diesel was 
deemed to be part of the costs of the whole industrial structure and as such 
had to be kept low to facilitate industrialization by the successive substitution 
of imports.  For decades we have kept gasoline prices above international 
market value and diesel prices below average value, roughly, 20% above and 
20% below, respectively.  This helped a great deal in obtaining the returns 
needed by alcohol fuel as it was protected by the gasoline price ceiling but 
now, for biodiesel, it complicates things a great deal because of the low price 
ﬂoor of diesel prices.
To make matters even more complex, the current national ﬁscal crisis 
has transformed the fuels market into a provider of revenue for both federal 
and the state governments, increasing the taxation load on the ﬁnal fuel price.  
Recently, the introduction of the “CIDE” (Contribution for Intervention 
in the Economic Domain) - an additional tax that helps prevent arbitration 
between the relative domestic and international prices – has made the value 
of the cross-subsidies within the monopoly more transparent. Finally, a 
complicated matrix of rail and road freight costs completes the ﬁnal price 
structure paid by the consumer at the ﬁlling station (intentionally forgetting 
the formation of natural gas prices within this matrix).
Everything added together, the price at the pump reﬂects between 10% 
and 20% freight, between 30% and 40% tax load, and, in the case of diesel, 
a transfer of 20% partially compensated by a similar addition to the price of 
gasoline (with the added hike of more than 20% alcohol in the mixture).  
Sugarcane alcohol is today the only renewable fuel that does not 
need subsidies to enter the international fuel market; in the domestic 
market it gets that extra boost through the gasoline price protection 
ceiling.  Biodiesel would have to come into the matrix carrying the onus of 
the low price ﬂoor applied to diesel fuel prices, which is the justiﬁcation for 
the subsidies implicit in the system of auction purchase of supply contracts.  
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 21 (59), 2007 181
This is the system that ensures biodiesel is trapped within the de-facto 
monopoly.
What is the opportunity cost for biodiesel in the Brazilian market?  As 
we import diesel oil to supplement internal supply, the cost of the imported 
raw material is the basis of the opportunity cost; the transport costs would 
also have to be included.  The tax transfers are a kind of compensation 
paid between those citizens that pay for the diesel and those who beneﬁt 
more from public and state expenditure, including those who hold supply 
contracts from ANP’s auctions.  If total tax exemptions were applied to the 
marketing of biodiesel, the transfers would happen automatically, without 
the intermediary of auctions; so that producers located far away from the 
reﬁneries would also receive the cost of freight built into the price of the 
diesel.  To the producer of biodiesel would be paid the opportunity cost of 
diesel, increased by an additional proportionate transfer which those already 
beneﬁting directly from public expenditure already receive.  The auctions are, 
in practice, a way of limiting entrance into the monopoly market, rationing 
part of the subsidy and of the transfer of monopolistic proﬁts that is built 
into the remuneration structure of the whole Brazilian fuels matrix. 
In search of the ideal raw material for biodiesel 
(and the ideal engine too)
Adapting biodiesel to the existing ﬂeet of diesel engines presents 
some problems that compromise a small part of its efﬁciency when using 
diesel alone.  Some of its viscosity characteristics improve performance, but 
others such as solvent and oxidation are still not properly treated for use 
of B100 (100% biodiesel).  For the most used engines, a thorough clean of 
all accumulated deposits would be appropriate plus a change of plastic and 
rubber components that can degrade when in contact with biodiesel.  These 
facts suggest a path for technological adaptation similar to that followed 
in Brazil for cars run exclusively on hydrated alcohol (Kojima & Johnson, 
2005, p77).  Small percentage mixtures, 2% to 5%, generate little gain in 
reduction of particle emissions but when mixed at 20%, with more signiﬁcant 
gains, the additional costs are of concern to the regulating agency, especially 
when suggested for large metropolitan centers. (Renewable…, 2004).  For 
this reason, many of the ongoing trials are recommended for use in captive 
ﬂeets (Raneses et al, 1999).  There is evidence that diesel engines of older 
generations, with combustion prechambers, are a lot less sensitive to those 
characteristics of biodiesel instability, but they are no longer in modern 
production lines (Kogima & Johnson, p.85).
If there is a need for technological adaptation, we are still not in a 
position to initiate massive programs, but only pilot projects and systematic 
expenditure in research and development of technology.  In turn, the costs of 
production suggest that there is high dependency on the raw-material used, 
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approximately 85% of the manufacturing cost.  In other papers presented at 
the Bioenergy Seminar of IEA/USP, it was evident that castor (mamona)
presents the highest costs and oil palm (dendê) the lowest. Coyoli palm
(Macaúba) and pine (pinho manso) are among those with the biggest yields, 
rape (canola) and sunﬂower (girasol), are in an intermediate range.  Soya, 
always among the viable options, produces four times more meal than oil, 
therefore, any larger scale program must take into account that the market 
price of meal may fall as well as the price of the bean (Raneses et al., 1999).  
Many of these alternative plants, especially those that are not used as food for 
humans, still depend on further research and development to ﬁnd the ideal 
form for cultivation on a large scale.  In economic terms, with crude oil at 
US$60 and US$70 per barrel, not even palm oil is an ideal raw material for 
a competitive biodiesel, and, anyway, it would mean diverting from human 
consumption the vegetable oil acknowledged as being the cheapest.
Implications for the regulation of future biodiesel 
If the cost of the raw material is such a high portion of the production 
cost, there is not much room for economies of scale in the industrial unit, 
as there is with ethanol from sugarcane.  The largest units that are being 
installed in Brazil stem from the system of subsidy auctions, and from the fact 
that deliveries to Petrobras reﬁneries demand a high logistical cost in which 
some advantage of scale may appear.
The opportunity cost of diesel is very much higher in the regions 
furthest from the reﬁneries; the pilot project and technological research 
should be speciﬁc to each region because there is reason to suppose that the 
ideal raw material will be different for each of them.  Amazon palm oil should 
not be distributed as biodiesel in the metropolitan centers of the Southeast 
of the country.  No raw material should travel more than two hundred 
kilometers to ﬁnd the ﬁnal consumer of biodiesel, yet castor bean today is 
probably traveling more than 1,500 kilometers. 
Incentives for technological innovation and research into genetic 
improvement of potential raw materials for biodiesel are fewest in the current 
auction system.  Given guaranteed proﬁts for castor bean (lowest rate of 
agricultural productivity and a low conversion ratio from fossil to renewable 
energy), all other raw materials are viable, within the present system of 
auctions.  Locking the program inside the de-facto monopoly leads to 
regional concentration and partnership strategies developed to win at 
auctions rather than to take the risks that would develop a winning 
technology for the future. 
We need, therefore, a new regulatory framework for the biodiesel of 
the future.
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ABSTRACT – The regulatory framework for fuels in Brazil is an effective monopoly, 
with matching prices for close substitutes. Biodiesel prices are unattractive because 
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innovation.
KEYWORDS: Fossil fuels monopoly, Biofuels, Biodiesel, Market regulation, 
Technological innovation.
Guilherme Leite da Silva Dias is full professor at the School of Economics, Business 
Administration and Accounting of the University of São Paulo,(FEA- USP).  The 
author is grateful for comments received during presentation at the Bioenergy 
Seminar of IEA-USP. @ –guildias@usp.br
– This text has been translated by Brian Stirner. The original in Portuguese – “Um 
desaﬁo novo: o biodiesel” – is available at www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_
issuetoc&pid=0103-401420070001&lng=pt&nrm=iso
Received on 2.1.2007 and accepted on 2.12.2007.
